1
   2
   3
   4
   5
   6
   7
   8
   9
  10
  11
  12
  13
  14
  15
  16
  17
  18
  19
  20
  21
  22
  23
  24
  25
  26
  27
  28
  29
  30
  31
  32
  33
  34
  35
  36
  37
  38
  39
  40
  41
  42
  43
  44
  45
  46
  47
  48
  49
  50
  51
  52
  53
  54
  55
  56
  57
  58
  59
  60
  61
  62
  63
  64
  65
  66
  67
  68
  69
  70
  71
  72
  73
  74
  75
  76
  77
  78
  79
  80
  81
  82
  83
  84
  85
  86
  87
  88
  89
  90
  91
  92
  93
  94
  95
  96
  97
  98
  99
 100
 101
 102
 103
 104
 105
 106
 107
 108
 109
 110
 111
 112
 113
 114
 115
 116
 117
 118
 119
 120
 121
 122
 123
 124
 125
 126
 127
 128
 129
 130
 131
 132
 133
 134
 135
 136
 137
 138
 139
 140
 141
 142
 143
 144
 145
 146
 147
 148
 149
 150
 151
 152
 153
 154
 155
 156
 157
 158
 159
 160
 161
 162
 163
 164
 165
 166
 167
 168
 169
 170
 171
 172
 173
 174
 175
 176
 177
 178
 179
 180
 181
 182
 183
 184
 185
 186
 187
 188
 189
 190
 191
 192
 193
 194
 195
 196
 197
 198
 199
 200
 201
 202
 203
 204
 205
 206
 207
 208
 209
 210
 211
 212
 213
 214
 215
 216
 217
 218
 219
 220
 221
 222
 223
 224
 225
 226
 227
 228
 229
 230
 231
 232
 233
 234
 235
 236
 237
 238
 239
 240
 241
 242
 243
 244
 245
 246
 247
 248
 249
 250
 251
 252
 253
 254
 255
 256
 257
 258
 259
 260
 261
 262
 263
 264
 265
 266
 267
 268
 269
 270
 271
 272
 273
 274
 275
 276
 277
 278
 279
 280
 281
 282
 283
 284
 285
 286
 287
 288
 289
 290
 291
 292
 293
 294
 295
 296
 297
 298
 299
 300
 301
 302
 303
 304
 305
 306
 307
 308
 309
 310
 311
 312
 313
 314
 315
 316
 317
 318
 319
 320
 321
 322
 323
 324
 325
 326
 327
 328
 329
 330
 331
 332
 333
 334
 335
 336
 337
 338
 339
 340
 341
 342
 343
 344
 345
 346
 347
 348
 349
 350
 351
 352
 353
 354
 355
 356
 357
 358
 359
 360
 361
 362
 363
 364
 365
 366
 367
 368
 369
 370
 371
 372
 373
 374
 375
 376
 377
 378
 379
 380
 381
 382
 383
 384
 385
 386
 387
 388
 389
 390
 391
 392
 393
 394
 395
 396
 397
 398
 399
 400
 401
 402
 403
 404
 405
 406
 407
 408
 409
 410
 411
 412
 413
 414
 415
 416
 417
 418
 419
 420
 421
 422
 423
 424
 425
 426
 427
 428
 429
 430
 431
 432
 433
 434
 435
 436
 437
 438
 439
 440
 441
 442
 443
 444
 445
 446
 447
 448
 449
 450
 451
 452
 453
 454
 455
 456
 457
 458
 459
 460
 461
 462
 463
 464
 465
 466
 467
 468
 469
 470
 471
 472
 473
 474
 475
 476
 477
 478
 479
 480
 481
 482
 483
 484
 485
 486
 487
 488
 489
 490
 491
 492
 493
 494
 495
 496
 497
 498
 499
 500
 501
 502
 503
 504
 505
 506
 507
 508
 509
 510
 511
 512
 513
 514
 515
 516
 517
 518
 519
 520
 521
 522
 523
 524
 525
 526
 527
 528
 529
 530
 531
 532
 533
 534
 535
 536
 537
 538
 539
 540
 541
 542
 543
 544
 545
 546
 547
 548
 549
 550
 551
 552
 553
 554
 555
 556
 557
 558
 559
 560
 561
 562
 563
 564
 565
 566
 567
 568
 569
 570
 571
 572
 573
 574
 575
 576
 577
 578
 579
 580
 581
 582
 583
 584
 585
 586
 587
 588
 589
 590
 591
 592
 593
 594
 595
 596
 597
 598
 599
 600
 601
 602
 603
 604
 605
 606
 607
 608
 609
 610
 611
 612
 613
 614
 615
 616
 617
 618
 619
 620
 621
 622
 623
 624
 625
 626
 627
 628
 629
 630
 631
 632
 633
 634
 635
 636
 637
 638
 639
 640
 641
 642
 643
 644
 645
 646
 647
 648
 649
 650
 651
 652
 653
 654
 655
 656
 657
 658
 659
 660
 661
 662
 663
 664
 665
 666
 667
 668
 669
 670
 671
 672
 673
 674
 675
 676
 677
 678
 679
 680
 681
 682
 683
 684
 685
 686
 687
 688
 689
 690
 691
 692
 693
 694
 695
 696
 697
 698
 699
 700
 701
 702
 703
 704
 705
 706
 707
 708
 709
 710
 711
 712
 713
 714
 715
 716
 717
 718
 719
 720
 721
 722
 723
 724
 725
 726
 727
 728
 729
 730
 731
 732
 733
 734
 735
 736
 737
 738
 739
 740
 741
 742
 743
 744
 745
 746
 747
 748
 749
 750
 751
 752
 753
 754
 755
 756
 757
 758
 759
 760
 761
 762
 763
 764
 765
 766
 767
 768
 769
 770
 771
 772
 773
 774
 775
 776
 777
 778
 779
 780
 781
 782
 783
 784
 785
 786
 787
 788
 789
 790
 791
 792
 793
 794
 795
 796
 797
 798
 799
 800
 801
 802
 803
 804
 805
 806
 807
 808
 809
 810
 811
 812
 813
 814
 815
 816
 817
 818
 819
 820
 821
 822
 823
 824
 825
 826
 827
 828
 829
 830
 831
 832
 833
 834
 835
 836
 837
 838
 839
 840
 841
 842
 843
 844
 845
 846
 847
 848
 849
 850
 851
 852
 853
 854
 855
 856
 857
 858
 859
 860
 861
 862
 863
 864
 865
 866
 867
 868
 869
 870
 871
 872
 873
 874
 875
 876
 877
 878
 879
 880
 881
 882
 883
 884
 885
 886
 887
 888
 889
 890
 891
 892
 893
 894
 895
 896
 897
 898
 899
 900
 901
 902
 903
 904
 905
 906
 907
 908
 909
 910
 911
 912
 913
 914
 915
 916
 917
 918
 919
 920
 921
 922
 923
 924
 925
 926
 927
 928
 929
 930
 931
 932
 933
 934
 935
 936
 937
 938
 939
 940
 941
 942
 943
 944
 945
 946
 947
 948
 949
 950
 951
 952
 953
 954
 955
 956
 957
 958
 959
 960
 961
 962
 963
 964
 965
 966
 967
 968
 969
 970
 971
 972
 973
 974
 975
 976
 977
 978
 979
 980
 981
 982
 983
 984
 985
 986
 987
 988
 989
 990
 991
 992
 993
 994
 995
 996
 997
 998
 999
1000
1001
1002
1003
1004
1005
1006
1007
1008
1009
1010
1011
1012
1013
1014
1015
1016
1017
1018
1019
1020
1021
1022
1023
1024
1025
1026
1027
// Copyright 2015-2017 Benjamin Fry <benjaminfry@me.com>
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0, <LICENSE-APACHE or
// http://apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license <LICENSE-MIT or
// http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option. This file may not be
// copied, modified, or distributed except according to those terms.

//! allows a DNS domain name holder to specify one or more Certification
//! Authorities (CAs) authorized to issue certificates for that domain.
//!
//! [RFC 6844, DNS Certification Authority Authorization, January 2013](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6844)
//!
//! ```text
//! The Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) DNS Resource Record
//! allows a DNS domain name holder to specify one or more Certification
//! Authorities (CAs) authorized to issue certificates for that domain.
//! CAA Resource Records allow a public Certification Authority to
//! implement additional controls to reduce the risk of unintended
//! certificate mis-issue.  This document defines the syntax of the CAA
//! record and rules for processing CAA records by certificate issuers.
//! ```

use std::str;

use error::*;
use rr::domain::Name;
use serialize::binary::*;
use url::Url;

/// The CAA RR Type
///
/// [RFC 6844, DNS Certification Authority Authorization, January 2013](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6844#section-3)
///
/// ```text
/// 3.  The CAA RR Type
///
/// A CAA RR consists of a flags byte and a tag-value pair referred to as
/// a property.  Multiple properties MAY be associated with the same
/// domain name by publishing multiple CAA RRs at that domain name.  The
/// following flag is defined:
///
/// Issuer Critical:  If set to '1', indicates that the corresponding
///    property tag MUST be understood if the semantics of the CAA record
///    are to be correctly interpreted by an issuer.
///
///    Issuers MUST NOT issue certificates for a domain if the relevant
///    CAA Resource Record set contains unknown property tags that have
///    the Critical bit set.
///
/// The following property tags are defined:
///
/// issue <Issuer Domain Name> [; <name>=<value> ]* :  The issue property
///    entry authorizes the holder of the domain name <Issuer Domain
///    Name> or a party acting under the explicit authority of the holder
///    of that domain name to issue certificates for the domain in which
///    the property is published.
///
/// issuewild <Issuer Domain Name> [; <name>=<value> ]* :  The issuewild
///    property entry authorizes the holder of the domain name <Issuer
///    Domain Name> or a party acting under the explicit authority of the
///    holder of that domain name to issue wildcard certificates for the
///    domain in which the property is published.
///
/// iodef <URL> :  Specifies a URL to which an issuer MAY report
///    certificate issue requests that are inconsistent with the issuer's
///    Certification Practices or Certificate Policy, or that a
///    Certificate Evaluator may use to report observation of a possible
///    policy violation.  The Incident Object Description Exchange Format
///    (IODEF) format is used [RFC5070].
///
/// The following example is a DNS zone file (see [RFC1035]) that informs
/// CAs that certificates are not to be issued except by the holder of
/// the domain name 'ca.example.net' or an authorized agent thereof.
/// This policy applies to all subordinate domains under example.com.
///
/// $ORIGIN example.com
/// .       CAA 0 issue "ca.example.net"
///
/// If the domain name holder specifies one or more iodef properties, a
/// certificate issuer MAY report invalid certificate requests to that
/// address.  In the following example, the domain name holder specifies
/// that reports may be made by means of email with the IODEF data as an
/// attachment, a Web service [RFC6546], or both:
///
/// $ORIGIN example.com
/// .       CAA 0 issue "ca.example.net"
/// .       CAA 0 iodef "mailto:security@example.com"
/// .       CAA 0 iodef "http://iodef.example.com/"
///
/// A certificate issuer MAY specify additional parameters that allow
/// customers to specify additional parameters governing certificate
/// issuance.  This might be the Certificate Policy under which the
/// certificate is to be issued, the authentication process to be used
/// might be specified, or an account number specified by the CA to
/// enable these parameters to be retrieved.
///
/// For example, the CA 'ca.example.net' has requested its customer
/// 'example.com' to specify the CA's account number '230123' in each of
/// the customer's CAA records.
///
/// $ORIGIN example.com
/// .       CAA 0 issue "ca.example.net; account=230123"
///
/// The syntax of additional parameters is a sequence of name-value pairs
/// as defined in Section 5.2.  The semantics of such parameters is left
/// to site policy and is outside the scope of this document.
///
/// The critical flag is intended to permit future versions CAA to
/// introduce new semantics that MUST be understood for correct
/// processing of the record, preventing conforming CAs that do not
/// recognize the new semantics from issuing certificates for the
/// indicated domains.
///
/// In the following example, the property 'tbs' is flagged as critical.
/// Neither the example.net CA nor any other issuer is authorized to
/// issue under either policy unless the processing rules for the 'tbs'
/// property tag are understood.
///
/// $ORIGIN example.com
/// .       CAA 0 issue "ca.example.net; policy=ev"
/// .       CAA 128 tbs "Unknown"
///
/// Note that the above restrictions only apply at certificate issue.
/// Since the validity of an end entity certificate is typically a year
/// or more, it is quite possible that the CAA records published at a
/// domain will change between the time a certificate was issued and
/// validation by a relying party.
/// ```
#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Clone)]
pub struct CAA {
    #[doc(hidden)] pub issuer_critical: bool,
    #[doc(hidden)] pub tag: Property,
    #[doc(hidden)] pub value: Value,
}

impl CAA {
    fn issue(
        issuer_critical: bool,
        tag: Property,
        name: Option<Name>,
        options: Vec<KeyValue>,
    ) -> Self {
        assert!(tag.is_issue() || tag.is_issuewild());

        CAA {
            issuer_critical,
            tag,
            value: Value::Issuer(name, options),
        }
    }

    /// Creates a new CAA issue record data, the tag is `issue`
    ///
    /// # Arguments
    ///
    /// * `issuer_critical` - indicates that the corresponding property tag MUST be understood if the semantics of the CAA record are to be correctly interpreted by an issuer
    /// * `name` - authorized to issue certificates for the associated record label
    /// * `options` - additional options for the issuer, e.g. 'account', etc.
    pub fn new_issue(issuer_critical: bool, name: Option<Name>, options: Vec<KeyValue>) -> Self {
        Self::issue(issuer_critical, Property::Issue, name, options)
    }

    /// Creates a new CAA issue record data, the tag is `issuewild`
    ///
    /// # Arguments
    ///
    /// * `issuer_critical` - indicates that the corresponding property tag MUST be understood if the semantics of the CAA record are to be correctly interpreted by an issuer
    /// * `name` - authorized to issue certificates for the associated record label
    /// * `options` - additional options for the issuer, e.g. 'account', etc.
    pub fn new_issuewild(
        issuer_critical: bool,
        name: Option<Name>,
        options: Vec<KeyValue>,
    ) -> Self {
        Self::issue(issuer_critical, Property::IssueWild, name, options)
    }

    /// Creates a new CAA issue record data, the tag is `iodef`
    ///
    /// # Arguments
    ///
    /// * `issuer_critical` - indicates that the corresponding property tag MUST be understood if the semantics of the CAA record are to be correctly interpreted by an issuer
    /// * `url` - Url where issuer errors should be reported
    ///
    /// # Panics
    ///
    /// If `value` is not `Value::Issuer`
    pub fn new_iodef(issuer_critical: bool, url: Url) -> Self {
        CAA {
            issuer_critical,
            tag: Property::Iodef,
            value: Value::Url(url),
        }
    }

    /// Indicates that the corresponding property tag MUST be understood if the semantics of the CAA record are to be correctly interpreted by an issuer
    pub fn issuer_critical(&self) -> bool {
        self.issuer_critical
    }

    /// The property tag, see struct documentation
    pub fn tag(&self) -> &Property {
        &self.tag
    }

    /// a potentially associated value with the property tag, see struct documentation
    pub fn value(&self) -> &Value {
        &self.value
    }
}

/// Specifies in what contexts this key may be trusted for use
#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Clone)]
pub enum Property {
    /// The issue property
    ///    entry authorizes the holder of the domain name <Issuer Domain
    ///    Name> or a party acting under the explicit authority of the holder
    ///    of that domain name to issue certificates for the domain in which
    ///    the property is published.
    Issue,
    /// The issuewild
    ///    property entry authorizes the holder of the domain name <Issuer
    ///    Domain Name> or a party acting under the explicit authority of the
    ///    holder of that domain name to issue wildcard certificates for the
    ///    domain in which the property is published.
    IssueWild,
    /// Specifies a URL to which an issuer MAY report
    ///    certificate issue requests that are inconsistent with the issuer's
    ///    Certification Practices or Certificate Policy, or that a
    ///    Certificate Evaluator may use to report observation of a possible
    ///    policy violation. The Incident Object Description Exchange Format
    ///    (IODEF) format is used [RFC5070].
    Iodef,
    /// Unknown format to TRust-DNS
    Unknown(String),
}

impl Property {
    fn as_str(&self) -> &str {
        match *self {
            Property::Issue => "issue",
            Property::IssueWild => "issuewild",
            Property::Iodef => "iodef",
            Property::Unknown(ref property) => property,
        }
    }

    /// true if the property is `issue`
    pub fn is_issue(&self) -> bool {
        if let Property::Issue = *self {
            true
        } else {
            false
        }
    }

    /// true if the property is `issueworld`
    pub fn is_issuewild(&self) -> bool {
        if let Property::IssueWild = *self {
            true
        } else {
            false
        }
    }

    /// true if the property is `iodef`
    pub fn is_iodef(&self) -> bool {
        if let Property::Iodef = *self {
            true
        } else {
            false
        }
    }

    /// true if the property is not known to TRust-DNS
    pub fn is_unknown(&self) -> bool {
        if let Property::Unknown(_) = *self {
            true
        } else {
            false
        }
    }
}

impl From<String> for Property {
    fn from(tag: String) -> Property {
        match &tag as &str {
            "issue" => return Property::Issue,
            "issuewild" => return Property::IssueWild,
            "iodef" => return Property::Iodef,
            &_ => (),
        }

        Property::Unknown(tag)
    }
}

/// Potential values.
///
/// These are based off the Tag field:
///
/// `Issue` and `IssueWild` => `Issuer`,
/// `Iodef` => `Url`,
/// `Unknown` => `Unknown`,
#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Clone)]
pub enum Value {
    /// Issuer authorized to issue certs for this zone, and any associated parameters
    Issuer(Option<Name>, Vec<KeyValue>),
    /// Url to which to send CA errors
    Url(Url),
    /// Unrecognized tag and value by TRust-DNS
    Unknown(Vec<u8>),
}

impl Value {
    /// true if this is an `Issuer`
    pub fn is_issuer(&self) -> bool {
        if let Value::Issuer(..) = *self {
            true
        } else {
            false
        }
    }

    /// true if this is a `Url`
    pub fn is_url(&self) -> bool {
        if let Value::Url(..) = *self {
            true
        } else {
            false
        }
    }

    /// true if this is an `Unknown`
    pub fn is_unknown(&self) -> bool {
        if let Value::Unknown(..) = *self {
            true
        } else {
            false
        }
    }
}

fn read_value(tag: &Property, decoder: &mut BinDecoder, value_len: u16) -> ProtoResult<Value> {
    match *tag {
        Property::Issue | Property::IssueWild => {
            let slice = decoder.read_slice(value_len as usize)?;
            let value = read_issuer(slice)?;
            Ok(Value::Issuer(value.0, value.1))
        }
        Property::Iodef => {
            let url = decoder.read_slice(value_len as usize)?;
            let url = read_iodef(url)?;
            Ok(Value::Url(url))
        }
        Property::Unknown(_) => Ok(Value::Unknown(decoder.read_vec(value_len as usize)?)),
    }
}

fn emit_value(encoder: &mut BinEncoder, value: &Value) -> ProtoResult<()> {
    match *value {
        Value::Issuer(ref name, ref key_values) => {
            // output the name
            if let Some(ref name) = *name {
                let name = name.to_string();
                encoder.emit_vec(name.as_bytes())?;
            }

            // if there was no name, then we just output ';'
            if name.is_none() && key_values.is_empty() {
                return encoder.emit(b';');
            }

            for key_value in key_values {
                encoder.emit(b';')?;
                encoder.emit(b' ')?;
                encoder.emit_vec(key_value.key.as_bytes())?;
                encoder.emit(b'=')?;
                encoder.emit_vec(key_value.value.as_bytes())?;
            }

            Ok(())
        }
        Value::Url(ref url) => {
            let url = url.as_str();
            let bytes = url.as_bytes();
            encoder.emit_vec(bytes)
        }
        Value::Unknown(ref data) => encoder.emit_vec(data),
    }
}

enum ParseNameKeyPairState {
    BeforeKey(Vec<KeyValue>),
    Key {
        key: String,
        key_values: Vec<KeyValue>,
    },
    Value {
        key: String,
        value: String,
        key_values: Vec<KeyValue>,
    },
}

/// Reads the issuer field according to the spec
///
/// [RFC 6844, DNS Certification Authority Authorization, January 2013](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6844#section-5.2)
///
/// ```text
/// 5.2.  CAA issue Property
///
///    The issue property tag is used to request that certificate issuers
///    perform CAA issue restriction processing for the domain and to grant
///    authorization to specific certificate issuers.
///
///    The CAA issue property value has the following sub-syntax (specified
///    in ABNF as per [RFC5234]).
///
///    issuevalue  = space [domain] space [";" *(space parameter) space]
///
///    domain = label *("." label)
///    label = (ALPHA / DIGIT) *( *("-") (ALPHA / DIGIT))
///
///    space = *(SP / HTAB)
///
///    parameter =  tag "=" value
///
///    tag = 1*(ALPHA / DIGIT)
///
///    value = *VCHAR
///
///    For consistency with other aspects of DNS administration, domain name
///    values are specified in letter-digit-hyphen Label (LDH-Label) form.
///
///    A CAA record with an issue parameter tag that does not specify a
///    domain name is a request that certificate issuers perform CAA issue
///    restriction processing for the corresponding domain without granting
///    authorization to any certificate issuer.
///
///    This form of issue restriction would be appropriate to specify that
///    no certificates are to be issued for the domain in question.
///
///    For example, the following CAA record set requests that no
///    certificates be issued for the domain 'nocerts.example.com' by any
///    certificate issuer.
///
///    nocerts.example.com       CAA 0 issue ";"
///
///    A CAA record with an issue parameter tag that specifies a domain name
///    is a request that certificate issuers perform CAA issue restriction
///    processing for the corresponding domain and grants authorization to
///    the certificate issuer specified by the domain name.
///
///    For example, the following CAA record set requests that no
///    certificates be issued for the domain 'certs.example.com' by any
///    certificate issuer other than the example.net certificate issuer.
///
///    certs.example.com       CAA 0 issue "example.net"
///
///    CAA authorizations are additive; thus, the result of specifying both
///    the empty issuer and a specified issuer is the same as specifying
///    just the specified issuer alone.
///
///    An issuer MAY choose to specify issuer-parameters that further
///    constrain the issue of certificates by that issuer, for example,
///    specifying that certificates are to be subject to specific validation
///    polices, billed to certain accounts, or issued under specific trust
///    anchors.
///
///    The semantics of issuer-parameters are determined by the issuer
///    alone.
/// ```
pub fn read_issuer(bytes: &[u8]) -> ProtoResult<(Option<Name>, Vec<KeyValue>)> {
    let mut byte_iter = bytes.iter();

    // we want to reuse the name parsing rules
    let name: Option<Name> = {
        let take_name = byte_iter.by_ref().take_while(|ch| char::from(**ch) != ';');
        let name_str = take_name.cloned().collect::<Vec<u8>>();

        if !name_str.is_empty() {
            let name_str = str::from_utf8(&name_str)?;
            Some(Name::parse(name_str, None)?)
        } else {
            None
        }
    };

    // initial state is looking for a key ';' is valid...
    let mut state = ParseNameKeyPairState::BeforeKey(vec![]);

    // run the state machine through all remaining data, collecting all key/value pairs.
    for ch in byte_iter {
        match state {
            // Name was already successfully parsed, otherwise we couldn't get here.
            ParseNameKeyPairState::BeforeKey(key_values) => {
                match char::from(*ch) {
                    // gobble ';', ' ', and tab
                    ';' | ' ' | '\u{0009}' => state = ParseNameKeyPairState::BeforeKey(key_values),
                    ch if ch.is_alphanumeric() && ch != '=' => {
                        // We found the beginning of a new Key
                        let mut key = String::new();
                        key.push(ch);

                        state = ParseNameKeyPairState::Key { key, key_values }
                    }
                    ch => {
                        return Err(
                            ProtoErrorKind::Msg(format!("bad character in CAA issuer key: {}", ch))
                                .into(),
                        )
                    }
                }
            }
            ParseNameKeyPairState::Key {
                mut key,
                key_values,
            } => {
                match char::from(*ch) {
                    // transition to value
                    '=' => {
                        let value = String::new();
                        state = ParseNameKeyPairState::Value {
                            key,
                            value,
                            key_values,
                        }
                    }
                    // push onto the existing key
                    ch if ch.is_alphanumeric() && ch != '=' && ch != ';' => {
                        key.push(ch);

                        state = ParseNameKeyPairState::Key { key, key_values }
                    }
                    ch => {
                        return Err(
                            ProtoErrorKind::Msg(format!("bad character in CAA issuer key: {}", ch))
                                .into(),
                        )
                    }
                }
            }
            ParseNameKeyPairState::Value {
                key,
                mut value,
                mut key_values,
            } => {
                match char::from(*ch) {
                    // transition back to find another pair
                    ';' => {
                        key_values.push(KeyValue { key, value });
                        state = ParseNameKeyPairState::BeforeKey(key_values);
                    }
                    // push onto the existing key
                    ch if ch.is_alphanumeric() => {
                        value.push(ch);

                        state = ParseNameKeyPairState::Value {
                            key,
                            value,
                            key_values,
                        }
                    }
                    ch => {
                        return Err(
                            ProtoErrorKind::Msg(
                                format!("bad character in CAA issuer value: {}", ch),
                            ).into(),
                        )
                    }
                }
            }
        }
    }

    // valid final states are BeforeKey, where there was a final ';' but nothing followed it.
    //                        Value, where we collected the final chars of the value, but no more data
    let key_values = match state {
        ParseNameKeyPairState::BeforeKey(key_values) => key_values,
        ParseNameKeyPairState::Value {
            key,
            value,
            mut key_values,
        } => {
            key_values.push(KeyValue { key, value });
            key_values
        }
        ParseNameKeyPairState::Key { key, .. } => {
            return Err(ProtoErrorKind::Msg(format!("key missing value: {}", key)).into())
        }
    };

    Ok((name, key_values))
}

/// Incident Object Description Exchange Format
///
/// [RFC 6844, DNS Certification Authority Authorization, January 2013](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6844#section-5.4)
///
/// ```text
/// 5.4.  CAA iodef Property
///
///    The iodef property specifies a means of reporting certificate issue
///    requests or cases of certificate issue for the corresponding domain
///    that violate the security policy of the issuer or the domain name
///    holder.
///
///    The Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF) [RFC5070] is
///    used to present the incident report in machine-readable form.
///
///    The iodef property takes a URL as its parameter.  The URL scheme type
///    determines the method used for reporting:
///
///    mailto:  The IODEF incident report is reported as a MIME email
///       attachment to an SMTP email that is submitted to the mail address
///       specified.  The mail message sent SHOULD contain a brief text
///       message to alert the recipient to the nature of the attachment.
///
///    http or https:  The IODEF report is submitted as a Web service
///       request to the HTTP address specified using the protocol specified
///       in [RFC6546].
/// ```
pub fn read_iodef(url: &[u8]) -> ProtoResult<Url> {
    let url = str::from_utf8(url)?;
    let url = Url::parse(url)?;
    Ok(url)
}

/// Issuer key and value pairs.
///
/// See [RFC 6844, DNS Certification Authority Authorization, January 2013](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6844#section-5.2)
/// for more explanation.
#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Clone)]
pub struct KeyValue {
    key: String,
    value: String,
}

impl KeyValue {
    /// Contstruct a new KeyValue pair
    pub fn new<K: Into<String>, V: Into<String>>(key: K, value: V) -> Self {
        KeyValue {
            key: key.into(),
            value: value.into(),
        }
    }
}

/// Read the bincary CAA format
///
/// [RFC 6844, DNS Certification Authority Authorization, January 2013](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6844#section-5.1)
///
/// ```text
/// 5.1.  Syntax
///
///   A CAA RR contains a single property entry consisting of a tag-value
///   pair.  Each tag represents a property of the CAA record.  The value
///   of a CAA property is that specified in the corresponding value field.
///
///   A domain name MAY have multiple CAA RRs associated with it and a
///   given property MAY be specified more than once.
///
///   The CAA data field contains one property entry.  A property entry
///   consists of the following data fields:
///
///   +0-1-2-3-4-5-6-7-|0-1-2-3-4-5-6-7-|
///   | Flags          | Tag Length = n |
///   +----------------+----------------+...+---------------+
///   | Tag char 0     | Tag char 1     |...| Tag char n-1  |
///   +----------------+----------------+...+---------------+
///   +----------------+----------------+.....+----------------+
///   | Value byte 0   | Value byte 1   |.....| Value byte m-1 |
///   +----------------+----------------+.....+----------------+
///
///   Where n is the length specified in the Tag length field and m is the
///   remaining octets in the Value field (m = d - n - 2) where d is the
///   length of the RDATA section.
///
///   The data fields are defined as follows:
///
///   Flags:  One octet containing the following fields:
///
///      Bit 0, Issuer Critical Flag:  If the value is set to '1', the
///         critical flag is asserted and the property MUST be understood
///         if the CAA record is to be correctly processed by a certificate
///         issuer.
///
///         A Certification Authority MUST NOT issue certificates for any
///         Domain that contains a CAA critical property for an unknown or
///         unsupported property tag that for which the issuer critical
///         flag is set.
///
///      Note that according to the conventions set out in [RFC1035], bit 0
///      is the Most Significant Bit and bit 7 is the Least Significant
///      Bit. Thus, the Flags value 1 means that bit 7 is set while a value
///      of 128 means that bit 0 is set according to this convention.
///
///      All other bit positions are reserved for future use.
///
///      To ensure compatibility with future extensions to CAA, DNS records
///      compliant with this version of the CAA specification MUST clear
///      (set to "0") all reserved flags bits.  Applications that interpret
///      CAA records MUST ignore the value of all reserved flag bits.
///
///   Tag Length:  A single octet containing an unsigned integer specifying
///      the tag length in octets.  The tag length MUST be at least 1 and
///      SHOULD be no more than 15.
///
///   Tag:  The property identifier, a sequence of US-ASCII characters.
///
///      Tag values MAY contain US-ASCII characters 'a' through 'z', 'A'
///      through 'Z', and the numbers 0 through 9.  Tag values SHOULD NOT
///      contain any other characters.  Matching of tag values is case
///      insensitive.
///
///      Tag values submitted for registration by IANA MUST NOT contain any
///      characters other than the (lowercase) US-ASCII characters 'a'
///      through 'z' and the numbers 0 through 9.
///
///   Value:  A sequence of octets representing the property value.
///      Property values are encoded as binary values and MAY employ sub-
///      formats.
///
///      The length of the value field is specified implicitly as the
///      remaining length of the enclosing Resource Record data field.
/// ```
pub fn read(decoder: &mut BinDecoder, rdata_length: u16) -> ProtoResult<CAA> {
    // the spec declares that other flags should be ignored for future compatability...
    let issuer_critical: bool = decoder.read_u8()? & 0b1000_0000 != 0;
    let tag_len = decoder.read_u8()?;
    let value_len = (rdata_length - u16::from(tag_len)) - 2;

    let tag = read_tag(decoder, tag_len)?;
    let tag = Property::from(tag);
    let value = read_value(&tag, decoder, value_len)?;

    Ok(CAA {
        issuer_critical,
        tag,
        value,
    })
}

// TODO: change this to return &str
fn read_tag(decoder: &mut BinDecoder, len: u8) -> ProtoResult<String> {
    if len == 0 || len > 15 {
        return Err(ProtoErrorKind::Message("CAA tag length out of bounds, 1-15").into());
    }
    let mut tag = String::with_capacity(len as usize);

    for _ in 0..len {
        let ch = char::from(decoder.pop()?);

        match ch {
            ch @ 'a'...'z' | ch @ 'A'...'Z' | ch @ '0'...'9' => {
                tag.push(ch);
            }
            _ => return Err(ProtoErrorKind::Message("CAA tag character(s) out of bounds").into()),
        }
    }

    Ok(tag)
}

/// writes out the tag in bincary form to the buffer, returning the number of bytes written
fn emit_tag(buf: &mut [u8], tag: &Property) -> ProtoResult<u8> {
    let property = tag.as_str();
    let property = property.as_bytes();

    let len = property.len();
    if len > ::std::u8::MAX as usize {
        return Err(ProtoErrorKind::Msg(format!("CAA property too long: {}", len)).into());
    }
    if buf.len() < len {
        return Err(
            ProtoErrorKind::Msg(format!(
                "insufficient capacity in CAA buffer: {} for tag: {}",
                buf.len(),
                len
            )).into(),
        );
    }

    // copy into the buffer
    let buf = &mut buf[0..len];
    buf.copy_from_slice(property);

    Ok(len as u8)
}

/// Write the RData from the given Decoder
pub fn emit(encoder: &mut BinEncoder, caa: &CAA) -> ProtoResult<()> {
    let mut flags = 0_u8;

    if caa.issuer_critical {
        flags |= 0b1000_0000;
    }

    encoder.emit(flags)?;
    // TODO: it might be interesting to use the new place semantics here to output all the data, then place the length back to the beginning...
    let mut tag_buf = [0_u8; ::std::u8::MAX as usize];
    let len = emit_tag(&mut tag_buf, &caa.tag)?;

    // now write to the encoder
    encoder.emit(len)?;
    encoder.emit_vec(&tag_buf[0..len as usize])?;
    emit_value(encoder, &caa.value)?;

    Ok(())
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use std::str;
    use super::*;

    #[test]
    fn test_read_tag() {
        let ok_under15 = b"abcxyzABCXYZ019";
        let mut decoder = BinDecoder::new(ok_under15);

        let read = read_tag(&mut decoder, ok_under15.len() as u8).expect("failed to read tag");

        assert_eq!(str::from_utf8(ok_under15).unwrap(), read);
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_bad_tag() {
        let bad_under15 = b"-";
        let mut decoder = BinDecoder::new(bad_under15);

        assert!(read_tag(&mut decoder, bad_under15.len() as u8).is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_too_short_tag() {
        let too_short = b"";
        let mut decoder = BinDecoder::new(too_short);

        assert!(read_tag(&mut decoder, too_short.len() as u8).is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_too_long_tag() {
        let too_long = b"0123456789abcdef";
        let mut decoder = BinDecoder::new(too_long);

        assert!(read_tag(&mut decoder, too_long.len() as u8).is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_from_str_property() {
        assert_eq!(Property::from("issue".to_string()), Property::Issue);
        assert_eq!(Property::from("issuewild".to_string()), Property::IssueWild);
        assert_eq!(Property::from("iodef".to_string()), Property::Iodef);
        assert_eq!(
            Property::from("unknown".to_string()),
            Property::Unknown("unknown".to_string())
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_read_issuer() {
        // (Option<Name>, Vec<KeyValue>)
        assert_eq!(
            read_issuer(b"ca.example.net; account=230123").unwrap(),
            (
                Some(Name::parse("ca.example.net", None).unwrap()),
                vec![
                    KeyValue {
                        key: "account".to_string(),
                        value: "230123".to_string(),
                    },
                ],
            )
        );

        assert_eq!(
            read_issuer(b"ca.example.net").unwrap(),
            (Some(Name::parse("ca.example.net", None,).unwrap(),), vec![],)
        );
        assert_eq!(
            read_issuer(b"ca.example.net; policy=ev").unwrap(),
            (
                Some(Name::parse("ca.example.net", None).unwrap(),),
                vec![
                    KeyValue {
                        key: "policy".to_string(),
                        value: "ev".to_string(),
                    },
                ],
            )
        );
        assert_eq!(
            read_issuer(b"ca.example.net; account=230123; policy=ev").unwrap(),
            (
                Some(Name::parse("ca.example.net", None).unwrap(),),
                vec![
                    KeyValue {
                        key: "account".to_string(),
                        value: "230123".to_string(),
                    },
                    KeyValue {
                        key: "policy".to_string(),
                        value: "ev".to_string(),
                    },
                ],
            )
        );
        assert_eq!(read_issuer(b";").unwrap(), (None, vec![]));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_read_iodef() {
        assert_eq!(
            read_iodef(b"mailto:security@example.com").unwrap(),
            Url::parse("mailto:security@example.com").unwrap()
        );
        assert_eq!(
            read_iodef(b"http://iodef.example.com/").unwrap(),
            Url::parse("http://iodef.example.com/").unwrap()
        );
    }

    fn test_encode_decode(rdata: CAA) {
        let mut bytes = Vec::new();
        let mut encoder: BinEncoder = BinEncoder::new(&mut bytes);
        emit(&mut encoder, &rdata).expect("failed to emit caa");
        let bytes = encoder.into_bytes();

        println!("bytes: {:?}", bytes);

        let mut decoder: BinDecoder = BinDecoder::new(bytes);
        let read_rdata = read(&mut decoder, bytes.len() as u16).expect("failed to read back");
        assert_eq!(rdata, read_rdata);
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_encode_decode_issue() {
        test_encode_decode(CAA::new_issue(true, None, vec![]));
        test_encode_decode(CAA::new_issue(
            true,
            Some(Name::parse("example.com", None).unwrap()),
            vec![],
        ));
        test_encode_decode(CAA::new_issue(
            true,
            Some(Name::parse("example.com", None).unwrap()),
            vec![KeyValue::new("key", "value")],
        ));
        // technically the this parser supports this case, though it's not clear it's something the spec allows for
        test_encode_decode(CAA::new_issue(
            true,
            None,
            vec![KeyValue::new("key", "value")],
        ));
        // test fqdn
        test_encode_decode(CAA::new_issue(
            true,
            Some(Name::parse("example.com.", None).unwrap()),
            vec![],
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_encode_decode_issuewild() {
        test_encode_decode(CAA::new_issuewild(false, None, vec![]));
        // other variants handled in test_encode_decode_issue
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_encode_decode_iodef() {
        test_encode_decode(CAA::new_iodef(
            true,
            Url::parse("http://www.example.com").unwrap(),
        ));
        test_encode_decode(CAA::new_iodef(
            false,
            Url::parse("mailto:root@example.com").unwrap(),
        ));
    }

    fn test_encode(rdata: CAA, encoded: &[u8]) {
        let mut bytes = Vec::new();
        let mut encoder: BinEncoder = BinEncoder::new(&mut bytes);
        emit(&mut encoder, &rdata).expect("failed to emit caa");
        let bytes = encoder.into_bytes();
        assert_eq!(&bytes as &[u8], encoded);
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_encode_non_fqdn() {
        let name_bytes: &[u8] = b"issueexample.com";
        let header: &[u8] = &[128, 5];
        let encoded: Vec<u8> = header
            .into_iter()
            .chain(name_bytes.iter())
            .map(|b| *b)
            .collect();

        test_encode(
            CAA::new_issue(
                true,
                Some(Name::parse("example.com", None).unwrap()),
                vec![],
            ),
            &encoded,
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_encode_fqdn() {
        let name_bytes: &[u8] = b"issueexample.com.";
        let header: [u8; 2] = [128, 5];
        let encoded: Vec<u8> = header.iter().chain(name_bytes.iter()).map(|b| *b).collect();

        test_encode(
            CAA::new_issue(
                true,
                Some(Name::parse("example.com.", None).unwrap()),
                vec![],
            ),
            &encoded,
        );
    }
}